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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
OTHO R. MURPHY,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
GRAND COUNTY, UTAH, a body
corporate and politic, and MARGIE M. SHAFER, County Clerk of
Grand County, Utah and Ex-Officio County Auditor,

Civil No. 7998

Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent
STATEMENT OF F AC.TS
The facts of this case are as set forth in plaintiff's
Amended Complaint and as alleged and admitted by de:Dendants: That Grand County, Utah is a body corporate
and politic and that the defendant Margie M. Shafer was,
at the commencement of this action, and at the time
judgm,ent was entered, the County Clerk of Grand County
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and Ex-Officio County Auditor; (Record, pp. 17, 24, 36);
that plaintiff was duly elected to the office of County Attorney of Grand County on the 7th day of November, 1950;
that he duly qualified and entered upon the performance
of his duti·es in that offic·e on the 1st day of January, 1951,
and ever since, he has been, and is now the duly ~elected,
qualified and acting county attorney of said county, (Record, pp. 17, 24, 36) ; that on April 3, 1950, pursuant to
Section 19-13-15, u.cA 1943, as amended, and within the
time therein specified, the then county commissioners of
Grand County, Utah pretended to fix the salary of the
county -attorney for the term commencing January 1, 1951,
and fix·ed the sum of $10.00 per year (Record, pp. 7, 10, 24,
37) ; that the salary of plaintiff's predec·essor in the office
of oounty attorney was $1,000.00 per year (Record, pp. 18,
24, 37) ; that at the tim·e said purported salary of $10.00
per year was fixed, Grand County, Utah had an assessed
valuation of $4,976,687 .00, and was a county of the Fourth
Class as provided by Section 19-13-13, U·CA 1943, as
amended (Record, p. 8) and the maximum salary for the
office of county attorney for said county was $L800.00
per year (Record, pp. 8, 34, 37; Section 19-13-14, UCA 1943
as amended); that the plaintiff p~esented his claim for
salary as county attorney to the board of county commissioners of Grand County on the basis of $1,000.00 per year
and his claim was rejected, whereupon this suit was instituted (R.ecord, pp. 25, 32, 38) ; that Section 19-13-15, UCA
1943 as amended, provides as follows:
"The Board of County Commissioners shall
biennially (sic) at a meeting held at least six
months prior to the election of county officers, fix
and determine the salaries of the county officers,
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for whom maximum salaries are fixed, for the
term next succeeding; provided that the salaries
of such officers shall not be diminished or incr,eased for the term for which they were elected and
shall have qualified; and provided further, that
should any board fail to fix the salary of any of
the county officers as provided in this section, the
salary of the predecessor of said officer whos·e
salary has been fixed shall apply; provided however said boards of County Commissioners may on
or before July 1, 1949 fix the salaries of county
offioers in amounts which in their opinion will
establish sufficient and proper salaries for services rendered or to be rendered by officers whose
salaries are so fix~ed ; and provided further that
the maximum salaries for oounty officers shall not
exc·eed in amount the maximum salaries as set
forth in Section 19-13-14 hereof."
Reference by appellants in their Statem·ent of Facts
contained in their brief to the "write-in" vote which elected
plaintiff, estoppel by reason of a "news item" appearing in
the Times-Independent. of Moab, Utah and the limitation
of the budget of Grand Cbunty as a defense, involves the
correctness of the ruling of the trial court and such matters
are not material facts pertaining to the issues of this case.

ARGUMENT
I
The Board of County Commissioners of Grand County.
Utah failed to exercise a fair and reasonabl~e discretion in
fixing the sum of $10.00 per year as the salary for the
County Attorney.
The court found that the sum of $10.00 per year was
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so small as to amount to no compensation at all for the
duti~es imposed by law upon the office of county attorney
and was ca1culated to discourage anyone from seeking said
office, or to Hmit aspirants to those willing to render the
s·ervic-e gratuitously, in violation of the provisions of Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of
Utah as amended, that "A county attorney shall be elected
by the qualified voters of each county ...." (Record, pp.
34, 37).
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision:
"One need but scan the index of our Code
under the title 'County Attorney' to obtain a realization of the importance of the office. Chapter
15, Title 19 enumerates his general duties. It is
im·portant to note that he must pass upon the
legality of County Commissioners claims for expenses (19-11-14), and that it is made his duty to
sue the Board to set aside excessive levies made
by them (80-9-19). I mention these particular
provisions, and could mention many mo~e, to point
out that a County Attorney has many functions
to perform which ·could not well be controlled by
the Commissioners, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 19-5-9. The importance of the
office and the duti~es to be performed could not
well be excluded from ·consideration in determining the salary to be fixed for the office. . . . .
They (county commissioners) must, how·ev·er,
hav~e anticipated that their action would discourage anyone from s·eeking the office or in any
event to limit aspirants to the office to those who
w~ere willing to render the service gratuitously,
and whatever their motives, the fixing of a fair
salary as compensation for the duties to be performed was not among the~m." (Record, p. 34).
The case of State ex rei. Yeargin v. Maschke et al ..
(Wash. 1916) 155 Pac. 1064, is in point. The state consti-
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tution authorized the appointment by the judge of the
Superior Court of the county of a ~court commissioner who
should perform "like duties as a judge of the superior
court at chambers, and perform such other duties connected with the administration of justice as may be prescrihed by law." The law provided that the court commissioner '~be allowed a salary in addition to :fees ·provided
for, in such sum as the board of ·county commission~rs may
designate." Prior to April 12, 1913 the salary had been
$15.00 per month. On that date the commissioners reduced
the salary to $1.00 per month ($12 per y·ear) : The relator
brought suit. The court found that the commissioners
were prompted by wrong motives. In the course of the
opinion the court states:
"It remains to inquire whether the board in
fixing the salary of the court commissioner at
$1 per month exercised an honest discretion, or
acted arbitrarily or fvom improper motives, and
thus faHed to exercise that discretion which the
law demands. * * * * * They seem to have been
actuated by one motive, and that was to so reduce
the salary as to force the resignation of the
~elator from that offioe. This was a g:r.oss abuse
of discretion."
It is submitted that the essence of that holding is that
in fixing the salary at $1.00 per month, the commissioners
faHed to exercise a legal discretion. The fact that they were
prompted by wrong motives does not detract from the force
of that holding.
II

The court has the power to review the action of the
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county commissioners to determine whether they have
exercis-ed a legal discretion.
The substance and burden of appellants' argument
and brief are that the Board has absolute disc~etion in the
matter of salary for county officers within the maximum
set by law and that the court has no power to review the
action of the board. The l~eading cas~e cited by appellants,
and from which they quote extensively, should be sufficient
answer to their contention:
". . . . . . If the theory of the appellants be correct, that the action of the board is final and cannot be review·ed by the courts, the taxpay~er in one
of the smaller counties may see the salaries fixed
at the maximum, without regard to the amount
of labor to be performed or other circumstances,
contrary to the public interests, and be powerless
to remedy the wrong...." Reynolds v. Board of
Commissioners, 6 Idaho 787, 59 Pac. 730.
While in the case just cited the court was concerned
about the max~mum salary being against the public interest under some circumstanc·es, by the same .token, a salary
fixed at so low a figure as to prevent the candidacy for the
office of county attorney, would place the choice for that
office completely in the hands of the commissioners in
which case they could pay whatev·er compensation they
desired to a "favorite", to the detriment of the public
interests.
Appellants als·o cited the case of Cawsey v. Brichey, 82
Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938. (Appellants' Brief, p. 6). In that
cas·e the court says, at page 942 :
". . . . The declared purpose of the act is the protection, propagation, and restoration of game, etc.
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The powers conferred upon the game ·oommission
must be construed with reference to that purpose. The power to set aside lands as a game
preserve necessarily implies not an arbitrary selection, but a selection of lands peculiarly suitable
for that purpose. The act, reasonably construed,
gives no power to select any other lands. True it
gives the commission a discretion, but the whol~e
purpose of the act furnishes a guide and marks a
limit to that discretion which excludes the right to
act avbitrarily.... "
Referring again to the case of State ex rei. Yeargin v.
Maschke et al., supra, the court says :
"The general rule, of course, is, that the discretionary power of the hoard of ·county commissioners is not subj eet to review by the court. But
this is not a universal rule. If the action of the
board of county commissioners is arbitrary or
capricious, or if its action is prompted by wrong
motives, there is not only an abus~e of dis·cretion,
but in contemplation of law there has been no
exercise of the discretionary power. If an honest
discretion, as demanded by the law, has not been
exercised, the result is to substitute arbitrary action f.or such discretion. If a tribunal such as the
board of county commissioners acts arbitrarily, or
refuses to exercise its discr~etion, the law will by
mandamus require it to exercise its discretionary
power."
From the foregoing it is made abundantly clear that
the courts may review the action of the county commissioners. If further proof is necessary, our own court has
announced its views on the question in the case of Startup
v. Harmon et al., Com'rs of Utah County, 59 Utah 329; 203
pac. 637 @ 639 :
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"
It is true the commissioners have the discretion to determine the amount necessary to be
provided, but it is not an arbitrary discretion; it is
a discretion that may be abused, and whenever
abuse is properly charged the question may be
reviewed ev~en in a mandamus proceeding. 18
R.C.L. p. 126; 26 Cyc. 161, 162."
The appellants put a great deal of emphasis on the
fact that there was no evidence offered by plaintiff to
prove the motive whi~ch prompted the ·Board's action.
When the case cam·e on for trial, both sides rested and the
cause was submitted on the record.
"The court is justified in finding facts as
they are alleged .and admitted or not denied in the
pleadings." 64 C. J. 1259, Trial, Sec. 1106
The essential facts of this case are all admitted. As
set forth in the Statement of Facts, the plaintiff was duly
elected; he qualified and entered upon the performance of
his duties as county attorney and ever since, he has been
and is now the duly elected, qualified and acting county
attorney of defendant county. The board of county commissioners in due time, purported to fix the salary for the
office of county attorney and fixed the same at $10.00 per
year. The salary of plaintiff's predecessor was $1,000.00
per y~ear.
It may be that the "finding" that the sum of $10.00
per year was so low "as to amount to no compensation at
all" is a legal conclusion drawn by the trial judge from the
facts as set forth in the pleadings and record. The fact
that it is included in the findings cannot prejudice the
defendants.
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"Under the practice in most jurisdictions, the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by
the trial judge in a case tried without a jury are
to be separately stated, although a failure to do
so may not be a ground for reversal where no
p!'ejudice results . . . . Propos~itions which are in
reality conclusions of law cannot be given effect
as findings even though included with the findings of fact . . . . . . . . .
In determining the character- of a finding, the
court will look to the substance theveof rather
than its classification. Conclusions. drawn by the
court in the exercise of its legal judgment from
facts found by it are conclusions of law, although
denominated findings of fact." 53 Am. Jur. 793794; Trial, Section 1138.
If $10.00 per year is no salary, then the Board failed
to fix any salary for the term beginning January 1, 1951.
Not having fixed any salary, the salary of plaintiff's predecessor prevails under the statute.
Appellants argue that the trial court substituted its
discretion for that of the commissiioners. This is not so.
The trial court found that the commissioners had fixed no
salary. The law, Section 19-13-15, UCA, 1943 as amended,
then applies. This court ,must decide whether the trial
court erred in concluding that $10.00 per year was no
salary for the county attorney under the circumstances.
Appellants also argue, in this oonnection, that "If the
Board abused its discvet:ion then it should be compelled
to exercise its discretion within reason and not be r·equired
to accept the judgment of the court as to what is a reasonable salary for the office of county attorney of Grand
County." (Appellants' Brief p. 14). If this theory be
correct, then the whole purpose of Section 19-13-15, UCA
1943 as amended would be def,eated. The salary would be
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determined by considering the particular person who held
office. In other words, the salary would be fixed after it
was known to the Board who had been elected to the office,
and the amount determined in the light of that knowledge.
To prevent this sort of thing, the Legislature provided
that if no salary was fixed within the time specifi,ed, the
salary of the prede·c~essor should prevail. Our Legislature
has set no minimum salary as have the legislatures of most
other states. Therefore, a reasonatble amount in the honest
discretion of the Board is all that is required. If this is not
provided, then the salary of the predecessor in office is
the maximum and the mini,mum.
Appellants in their Bri,ef (p. 14-15) cite and quote extensiv~ely from the case of Merwin v. Board of Com'rs,
(Colo. 1901) 67 Pac. 285, apparently ~or the propositions
that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the Board, but if the board has failed to act, then the
court can compel it to act; and that "Where one enters
into a public office for which no compensation has been
provided by law, he is presumed to give his services: ...."
The case is not in point. In the :f.irst place, under the Utah
law the Board cannot be oompeUed to act. It ·either fixes a
reasonabl~e salary for the office, or the salary of the predecessor prevails. In the second place, the Colorado law provided that deputy district attorneys should not be allowed
any fees for attendance before justices of the peace in
misdemeanors ; and the county commissioners ''might, in
their discretion, disallow any charges against the county
for fees or costs of district attorneys, or other persons, for
the trial or examination of any criminal case, before any
justice of the peace, poliee magistrate, police judge, or any
court not being a court of record." It was for such serv-
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ices that the plaintiff in that case was suing £or the value
of his services. There is no similarity between that case
and the instant case.
As to the proposition that plaintiff is presumed to give
his services in an office for which no salary is provided,
it is submitted that this is untenable under the Utah l~aw.
Else why the provision that the salary of the predecessor
shall prevail where no salary is fixed?
III

Plaintiff is not estopped from cl~aiming salary in the
amount provided for his predecessor in office.
A. An elective office is not a ,contract and the elements of estoppel do not apply.
"The salary of a public offi,cer is an emolument of the office and rules governing contractual
velations 'and obligations in ordinary cases are not
applicable in fixing such salary." Cahill v. Beltrami County, (Minn.) 29 N.W. (2d) 444;
"A public officer cannot estop himself from
claiming his statu tory salary by agreeing to accept or by ~acc,epting a lesser sum than is provided
by statute." Fannin County v. Dobbs, (Texas) 202
s.w. (2d) 950.
B.

Notice of salaries fixed unnecessary.

In the matter of fixing salaries of county officers,
there is nothing in the statute that provides for official
notice of the amounts so fix,ed, so that assuming that
plaintiff knew of the amount provided by the Board was
$10.00 per year, knowledge did not prevent him from
claiming his s,alary as provided by law.
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Even if official notice was required, it is submitted
that the news item contained in the Times-Independent,
issue of April 6, 1950, pertaining to the salary of the
county attorney was not sufficient. The only reference to
that matter in the news item was two and one-fourth lines
of small type at the end of the repo:vt entitled "LET CONTRACT FOIR 0 ILING AIRP 0 RT * * *: the salary of county
attorney was reduced from $1000.00 to $10.00 per year".
(Record p. 15)
1

1

1

IV
The county commissioners may not, by reducing salary or otherwise, abolish an ·elective office created by the
Constitution.
In Argyle vs. Wright, 63 Utah 184; 224 Pac. 649, the
plaintiff sought a writ of mandate against the county
auditor of Utah County, compelling him to draw his w·arrant in fav;or of plaintiff for a years salary as county
surveyor, to which office plaintiff has been duly elected
and had qualified. Def.endants ·contended that plaintiff
had abandoned his offi0e and the trial court so concluded.
This conclusion was revers·ed on appeal and this court in
the course of its opinion at page 651 of the Pacific citation
states:
"No authority is found in the statutes of this
state authorizing boards of county commissioners
to remove a county officer from office or to declare a vacancy by any act on the part of such
commissioners."
In the case of Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of
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Com'rs 71 Utah 593; 268 Pac. 783, the county commissioners suspended six deputy sheriffs on the theory that they,
the commissioners, had the absolute power and right to do
so. In denying the commissioners' power to suspend the
deputies, and making permanent the writ of prohibition
prayed for, this court stated:
"The Sheriff's office is an elective office of
the county, as is also the office of a county commissioner, and is a co-ordinate office or branch
of our county government. His pow~ers and duties
are prescribed by statute and are similar to those
generally prescribed by other western states. In
performing them, he, generally speaking, acts independently of the board of county commissioners
except as otherwise restricted and specified by
statute."
I~t

is submitted that the quotation can be paraphr·as~ed
to apply to the office of county attorney with the same
effect ·as it applied to the office of the sheriff.
"The phrase 'by and with the consent and
approval of the board of county commissioners,'
contained in section 7873, supra, is not involved in
the facts now presented. That phrase vests no discretion in the board of county commissioners in
so far as the duty to mak~e provision for the payment of the salary of the position is ·concerned.
That phrase does vest a discretion in the hoard,
whereby it determines whether a nomination of an
individual for appointm·ent to the position shall be
confirmed or rejected. The position created cannot
be abolished by failuve to provide a salary."
Board of County Com'rs of Mcintosh County et al.
v. Kirby, Court Clerk, et al. Okl. 1935) 49 p. (2d)
746.
"Section 4448, O.S. 1931, provides that in
every county in the state there shall be appointed
by the State Commissioner of Health a county
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superintendent of public health. This section further prescribes his qualifications and duties. Section 7770, O.S. 1931, directs that the board of
county commissioners shall pay him certain designated compensation. . . . . .We held in Board of
County Commissioners of M·clntosh County et al.
v. Kirby, 174 Okl. 20, 49 P. (2d) 746, that no discretion is lodged in the hoard of county commissioners in so far as the duty to make provisions
for the payment of the salary or a deputy court
clerk is concerned. We also held that the position,
created by the Legislatu~e, cannot be abolished
by failure to provide a salary by appropriation,
and also affirmed ·a writ of mandamus to make
the appropriation, granted in that action by the
lower court." Board of Com'rs of Carter County et
al. v. Dorough, (Okl. 1936) 59 P. (2d) 273.
1

v
The appellants ave not prevented by budget limitations from paying plaintiff the salary due him.
The case of Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329; 203 Pac.
637, ·c·ited aJbove, is sufficient answ·er to appellants' argument. This court stated, at page 639 of the Pacific citation:
"It is further contended as matter of defense
that there are no funds at present out of which
provision can be expressly made for the purpose
demanded in this proceeding. Ordinarily such a
defens~e is a complete answer to an application for
a writ of mandate; that which is impossible cannot justly be required. But assuming there are no
funds at the present time available for the purpose in question, it does not necessarily follow
that such condition must continue indefinitely.
Utah county is a quasi public corporation, a legal
subdivision of the state, with ample power to
assess and collect taxes for all legitimate purposes
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authorized by the laws of the state. It is quite
true that taxes must be assessed, levied, and collected at the time and in the manner provided by
law. Defendants contend that it is now too late
to assess and collect additional taxes for the year
1921. They also insist that it is too early to compel the assessment and collection of taxes for the
year 1922. It is also suggested that no ·person has
the right to anticipate that defendants will refuse
to make the provision that may be required in
1922, and that until defendants do refuse there
is no ground for action against them. Upon this
point they cite High on E~xtraordinary Legal Remedies (3d Ed.) p. 17, page 160, par. 144, and page
19, par. 14; also State v. Rising 15 Nev. 164.
"The contention, to say the least, is ingenious,
if not disingenuous. If i~t is too late to assess and
collect taxes for 1921, because the time has past
within which it can lawfully be done, and too
·early for 1922, because the time when it can be
done has not yet arrived, it is easy to see, in a
meritorious case, that grave injustice might be
done; in fact it might happen, if the rule contended for were rrigidly enforced, that relief in a case
of this kind ·could never be obtained. The contention of defendants is squarely met hy a somewhat
lengthy quotation furnished by plaintiff from a
Colorado case reported in 110 Pac. 197 . . .''

VI
The court did not err in striking Third and Fourth
Defenses of ans~wer.
The appellants complain at the action of the ·court in
striking the Third and Fourth Defenses of their answer
(Appellants' Brief p. 3) .
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Strike on or about the 8th
day of May, 1952 (R.ecord, p. 28), and the same came on
regularly for hearing June 17, 1952 (Record, p. --------------·
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Minute Entry, June 17, 1952). The court sustained the
motion " ...with the understanding that on pretrial counsel for defendant may be heard on the motion if he so
desires."
Counsel for defendants made no move to argue the
matter or to vacate the court's or-der striking the Third
and Fourth Defenses.
Rule 7 (b) (2) URJCP reads in part as follows:
". . . .E~xcept as otherwise specifically provided by these rules, any order made without notice
to the adverse party may be vacated or modified
without notice by the judge who made it, or may
be vacated or modifi,ed on notic~e ..... "
Therefore, even if the court erred in sustaining the
plaintiff's Motion to Strike the defendants' Third and
Fourth Defens~es, defendants' may not be heard to complain for their failure to move for a vacation or modification of the court's order.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSI 0N
1

By way of Summary and Conclusion, this court is
confronted with the facts: (a) that the office of County
Attorney in the State of Utah is, and was a ·constitutional
and ~elective office in each County; (b) that Grand County,
Utah was a county of the Fourth Class with the maximum
salary for the office of county attorney fixed by the Legislature at $1800.00 per year; (c) that the salary of the
plaintiff's predecessor in office was $1000.00 per y()ar; (d)
that the Board of County Commissioners of Grand County,
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Utah, on April 3, 1950, fixed the sum of $10.00 per year as
"compensation" for the performance of the duties of ·county attorney of Grand County for the term com,mencing
January 1, 1951; (~e) that plaintiff was duly ·elected on
November 7, 1950 to the office of county attorney of Grand
County, and on the 1st day of January, 1951, duly qualified
and entered upon the performanc·e of his duties as such
attorney, and ·ever since, he has been, and is now the duly
elected, qualified and acting County Attorney of Grand
County, Utah; (f) that plaintiff duly presented his claim
for salary as such county attorney on the basis of $1000.00
per year and his claim was rejected and disallow·ed by .the
Board of County Commissioners.
Even if it be conceded that the Board had no ulterior
motive in fixing the sum of $10.00 per year as "compensation" for the performance of the duties of county attorney, yet they must have intended the consequences of
their action deliberately taken.
" . . . . . The result either way, as a practical
matter, simply brings the bridge into the district
for taxation purpos·es. Such inevitably is the sole
result of including the river within the district,
and legislative bodies, as well as individuals, must
be presumed to have intended the necessary and
inevitable result of their action." Portland General Electric Co. V. City of Estacada, (Ore. 1952)
241 P. 2d 1129 @ 1145.
They could not s·eriously have expected any person to
have undertaken the duties and responsibilities of such an
office for such a small compensation. The idea is palpably
aJbsurd. They must have anticipated that no person would
choose to run for offic,e for such a nominal "salary".
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Therefore they must have intended to prevent the candidacy of any person for the office of County Attorney.
The answer to the argument that a nominal "salary"
did not prevent the election of a county attorney is found
in the basis for this suit :-that $10.00 per year is not a
salary; that the Board of 'County Commissioners failed to
fix any salary for the office of ·county attorney for the
term commencing January 1, 1951 and that the salary of
plaintiff's predecessor, to wit, $1000.00 per year, is the
salary to which he is entitled.
Respectively submitted
HA~M~MOND

& HAMMOND

By Mark Hammond
Attorneys for Plaintiff
August, 1953
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